Arizona Supreme Court holds that property owners may quiet title to their property after the statute of limitations on a debt runs. The confusion comes from a 1914 case from the Arizona Supreme Court called Provident v. Schwerner. The court, over a hundred years ago, relied upon the notion that equity (clearing title) was not available to a mortgagor when his mortgage debt remained unpaid. In 1941, the legislature enacted A.R.S. § 12-1104, which states that a person may quiet title when the statute of limitations runs on an action to enforce a lien or judgment.  The argument was that a deed of trust is something different and remains even if the statute of limitations on the debt has expired. Provident conflicts with the statute. Under Arizona’s constitution, the common law is subordinated to the legislature. Further, equity cannot upset rights defined by statute. We agree with all of this, but doesn’t it feel strange that in 2025 we are overruling a 1914 Arizona Supreme Court decision by applying a 1941 statute?

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We spoke too soon. On March 25, we discussed vested rights and retroactive statutes, and the next day this case comes out. The Arizona Supreme Court holds that a more recent statutory amendment to the workers’ compensation act, which makes it easier for firefighters to have cancer covered, does not apply because the defense had a vested right under the earlier statute. The defense vested when the plaintiff filed the lawsuit. Yet another reason to re-read Hall.  Justice Montgomery authored a vigorous dissent. He has a different view on when and what rights vests. The “manifest intent” must consider that the statutory amendment was born from Arizona’s constitution and “necessarily operates with the intent and purpose to compensate as many employees as are qualified under the WCA” and “advances the remedial purpose of the WCA.” We got Grammatico goosebumps just reading this.

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We have had too much sun today and are getting cranky. This case from Navajo County makes us even more cranky. Feuding neighbors, the Crowes and the Giersts, settled their differences in 2016. Years later they are back at each other. This time the dispute went to a nine-day jury trial. The jury found in favor of the Crowes for the Giersts breach of the earlier settlement agreement but awarded them no damages. The jury found for the Giersts on their counterclaim for breach of good faith and fair dealing and awarded 25k, part of which was for punitive damages. Both sides claimed victory. On appeal, the Giersts contended they were entitled to attorney’s fees in addition to the jury award. The Giersts, however, had presented their attorney fee claim during trial as part of their damage claims, a whopping $162,750. There are only a few rare instances when attorney’s fees constitute damages, and this isn’t one of them. It was error to present this to the jury. The Giersts invited the error and cannot complain. Unlike the fees, however, the Giersts did not request these from the jury. They could be entitled to their costs, but the trial court never explained its reasons for denying them. The case is remanded so the trial court can explain. As for claims by both sides for fees on this appeal, the court of appeals awarded the Crowes their fees and costs (our guess is the fees will be 25k and no one gets anything. Two weeks in trial and thousands and thousands in wasted fees by both sides.  We question why this is a published opinion. We are tired of reading about feuding neighbors. When neighbors settle a dispute, we demand a fence or, at a minimum, an ADR clause in the settlement agreement.