Under the common law, statutes of limitations do not apply to the State and public entities. This is known as the “nullum tempus occurrit regi” doctrine, i.e., time does not run against the king. Arizona has a statute that codifies most of this. A.R.S. § 12-510. Here, one public entity sued another, and the issue was whether A.R.S. § 12-821, the one-year limitations against public entities, applies when a public entity is the plaintiff. The statute states: “All actions against any public entity or public employee shall be brought within one year after the cause of action accrues and not afterward.”

The Arizona Supreme Court held that the statute does not expressly override the common law and, in context, appears in a section involving claims by private parties against public entities. Justice Beene, who authored the opinion, distinguished the Glenayre Electronics and played the textualists’ get-out-of-text-free cards well. Thus, the word “all” is not absolute. The court devoted a few paragraphs to countering Justice Bolick’s dissent. Justice Bolick’s textualism takes a more absolutist view. All means all. Sort of Shylockian, we might add.

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The opinion opens: “A deal is a deal, especially in Arizona—a right-to-contract state. With no significant overriding public policy considerations, Arizona holds parties to their deals.” We wonder whether any states view themselves differently. And if the issue of clawing back overpayments is so easily resolved, why does this opinion take so many pages? The trial court accepted the “voluntary payment doctrine,” and the court of appeals decided we needed a contract class, or perhaps an equitable remedies class. The court of appeals distinguished a Division Two case, Wood v. Northwest Hosp. LLC, in which the doctrine was applied to overpayments made to an employee/physician. Whatever equity door the Wood case may have opened, it seems mostly closed.

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At an arraignment in city court, a self-represented criminal defendant provided a vulgar email address using the prosecutor’s name. The insult was not recognized until later in the court’s chambers. The court then held the defendant in direct contempt. The defendant filed a special action with the superior court, arguing that the First Amendment applied. The prosecutor argued the words were “fighting words” and unprotected by the First Amendment. The court of appeals held that these were not fighting words and that this was not a First Amendment issue. The court of appeals reversed for different reasons. While a court has the right to control decorum in court, holding someone in criminal contempt requires showing that the defendant willfully disobeyed a court order, obstructed the administration of justice, or lessened the court’s dignity and authority. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 35.1. The court of appeals reaffirmed that offending the “dignity and authority” of the court should be applied with causation. Here, the defendant was not loud or boisterous, did not disrupt the proceeding, and did not harass or intimidate anyone. The city court should also have provided due process, i.e., notice and opportunity to be heard. The concurrence would add that the Eighth Amendment was violated. A sentence of 180 days was grossly disproportionate.

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