This opinion makes our heads hurt. Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 76(d) provides that if a claim goes to arbitration, the arbitrator makes an award, and no appeal is taken, then after 30 days any party may file a motion to enter judgment. If no one does anything, after 125 days the clerk can send notice, and then after another 30 days, the court “must dismiss the action without prejudice.” Plaintiffs Sanchez won at arbitration and was awarded approximately $37k.

But then no one did anything. The clerk sent out the notice, but the court never dismissed. Two years later, the plaintiff woke up and filed to confirm the arbitration award as a judgment. The judgment was entered when the defendant failed to object. The defendant then woke up. The defendant argued that because 76(d) required the court to dismiss the suit, the court lacked power to enter the judgment and that Sanchez failed to prosecute her case. The defendant successfully had the trial court set aside the judgment and dismiss the lawsuit without prejudice. The plaintiff then refiled the lawsuit, but that too was dismissed by the trial court for failure to prosecute. The court then awarded the defendant its $27k in fees in the second lawsuit for creating a “procedural quagmire.”

The court of appeals held that the trial court was correct the first time it entered judgment on the arbitration award. A case does not end on its own without court action. We learn from a United States Supreme Court decision, Dolan v. United States, that Rule 76(d) is best understood as a claims-processing rule, not a jurisdiction rule. Because no court action was taken, the plaintiff was within his rights to request judgment on the arbitration award. Bottom line: the plaintiffs keep their arbitration award and judgment, and everything the trial judge did at the defendant’s urging, including awarding the defendant fees, was vacated.

The court of appeals should have ended its opinion there. Instead, we get unnecessary explanations of the history behind Rule 76(d) and the ability to refile. We get explanations of Rule 41, Rule 58, federal case law, and “manifest injustice.”  These excursions are unnecessary and lack the modesty we desire from appellate courts.

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Parents filed suit against the school district under Arizona’s Parents’ Bill of Rights, A.R.S. § 1-602. The case involved a junior high school student who, with the support of the school and the district’s policies, was using a boy’s name instead of her given name. Parents learned of this so-called “in-school gender transition,” objected, and the school initially told the parents that teachers would abide by the parents’ express request that the child be referred to only by her given name.

The court reversed the trial court’s ruling that the case was moot because the child had moved to a different school. So what? The parent has the right to sue for past interference and to seek declaratory relief to prevent further violations. The school also argued the suit was untimely. The court partially agreed. Although the parents initially learned of the issue more than a year before the suit was filed, the school later falsely reassured them that it would stop. It didn’t, and that second violation triggered a new accrual date. A few cleanup issues: the superintendent was named in her official capacity, making her a redundant defendant; the board member who brought her own claim lacks authority and standing to claim she was denied the right to vote on the policies, which were implemented before she was elected.

We expect more of these lawsuits brought by parents for in-school gender transitions. This is a minefield for schools to navigate, and attorneys have started advertising for these cases. This case is its own advertisement.

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We generally do not blog criminal cases, but this one involves A.R.S. 28-672, which imposes a criminal penalty for a violation of certain civil traffic laws, including the red-light statute. The enhanced penalty statute turns a civil traffic violation into a criminal violation when “the violation results in an accident causing serious physical injury or death. . . ”  We emphasize the words ‘”results in”‘ because the opinion depends on them.

The defendant rear-ended a vehicle stopped at a red light. The impact pushed both vehicles into the intersection, resulting in the death of one of the occupants. The Arizona Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Judge Montgomery, held that the enhanced penalty statute does not apply. After consulting dictionaries, including the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, the court concluded that “results in” refers to a sequence of events: first, a moving violation, and then an accident. Since the defendant did not enter the intersection until after the collision, the civil traffic violation did not cause the accident. (This is the second time Montgomery has referenced the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy when interpreting causation.) Justice Bolick authored a vigorous dissent and concluded by urging the legislature to amend the statute, lamenting: “But even if it does, it will be cold comfort to the victim family, which in our view was clearly within the intended protective scope of the enhanced penalty statute.” Such comments are intended to do what?