Because the Municipal Risk Retention Pool is an insurer created under state law and member municipalities, the notice of claim statute applies. A.R.S. § 12-821.01 Plaintiff missed both the notice of claim deadline and the statute of limitations deadlines for claims against public entities. The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the Risk Pool. The second issue was whether a separate bad-faith claim can be asserted against a third-party administrator. No. The Court of Appeals agreed that there is no contractual relationship between a third-party claim administrator and an insured, and that the insured had no direct claim. There was also no “joint venture.” But, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court erred in awarding the administrator attorney’s fees under § 12-341.01. This makes sense when there is no contractual relationship. Apparently, plaintiff’s counsel has lost this same issue in federal district court. The defendant argued that the award of fees should be upheld because the case was frivolous. While the district court case may be persuasive, it is not precedent. The Court of Appeals sent the issue of frivolity back to the trial court. One judge tacked on a concurrence and acknowledged that, although no one raised it, the Risk Pool is a public entity and is therefore subject to the Open Meeting and Public Records law. One may ask, “So, what?” Many public entities have risk departments, claim handlers, and attorneys. Is the judge suggesting that this is all an open book?

This opinion makes our heads hurt. Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 76(d) provides that if a claim goes to arbitration, the arbitrator makes an award, and no appeal is taken, then after 30 days any party may file a motion to enter judgment. If no one does anything, after 125 days the clerk can send notice, and then after another 30 days, the court “must dismiss the action without prejudice.” Plaintiffs Sanchez won at arbitration and was awarded approximately $37k.

But then no one did anything. The clerk sent out the notice, but the court never dismissed. Two years later, the plaintiff woke up and filed to confirm the arbitration award as a judgment. The judgment was entered when the defendant failed to object. The defendant then woke up. The defendant argued that because 76(d) required the court to dismiss the suit, the court lacked power to enter the judgment and that Sanchez failed to prosecute her case. The defendant successfully had the trial court set aside the judgment and dismiss the lawsuit without prejudice. The plaintiff then refiled the lawsuit, but that too was dismissed by the trial court for failure to prosecute. The court then awarded the defendant its $27k in fees in the second lawsuit for creating a “procedural quagmire.”

The court of appeals held that the trial court was correct the first time it entered judgment on the arbitration award. A case does not end on its own without court action. We learn from a United States Supreme Court decision, Dolan v. United States, that Rule 76(d) is best understood as a claims-processing rule, not a jurisdiction rule. Because no court action was taken, the plaintiff was within his rights to request judgment on the arbitration award. Bottom line: the plaintiffs keep their arbitration award and judgment, and everything the trial judge did at the defendant’s urging, including awarding the defendant fees, was vacated.

The court of appeals should have ended its opinion there. Instead, we get unnecessary explanations of the history behind Rule 76(d) and the ability to refile. We get explanations of Rule 41, Rule 58, federal case law, and “manifest injustice.”  These excursions are unnecessary and lack the modesty we desire from appellate courts.

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Parents filed suit against the school district under Arizona’s Parents’ Bill of Rights, A.R.S. § 1-602. The case involved a junior high school student who, with the support of the school and the district’s policies, was using a boy’s name instead of her given name. Parents learned of this so-called “in-school gender transition,” objected, and the school initially told the parents that teachers would abide by the parents’ express request that the child be referred to only by her given name.

The court reversed the trial court’s ruling that the case was moot because the child had moved to a different school. The parent still has the right to sue for past interference and to seek declaratory relief to prevent further violations. The school also argued the suit was untimely. The court partially agreed. Although the parents initially learned of the issue more than a year before the suit was filed, the school later falsely reassured them that it would stop. It didn’t, and that second violation triggered a new accrual date. A few cleanup issues: the superintendent was named in her official capacity, making her a redundant defendant; the board member who brought her own claim lacks authority and standing to claim she was denied the right to vote on the policies, which were implemented before she was elected.

We expect more of these lawsuits brought by parents for in-school gender transitions. This is a minefield for schools to navigate, and attorneys have started advertising for these cases. This case is its own advertisement.

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