We keep reading appellate decisions about this tragedy out of Cochise County. This is the third appellate decision we can recall. Dr. Herrod is a general practitioner and a lay pastor, an LDS bishop, at a church. He learned information as a pastor that father sexually abused his children. The abused children claimed that as a physician and mandatory reporter, he was required to notify authorities even if the information came to him as privileged as a pastor and not while treating either the mother or the abused children. Court of appeals agrees with the trial court rejecting this theory. “Under the express language of the statute, Dr. Herrod had a duty to report only if he developed a reasonable belief of child abuse or neglect “in the course of treating a patient.” § 13-3620(A)(1).” There is a concurrence and dissent. In a nutshell, the dissent would find an expansive common law duty of well-being outside the mandatory reporter statute. The dissent doesn’t care how he learned of the abuse, the abuse impacted his patient’s well-being.

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Another neighborly dispute. A neighbor sues her neighbors for making too much noise. She cites the CC&Rs and requests fees but then loses at a bench trial. The neighbors then demand their fees. Although there is a clause in the CC&Rs prohibiting noise and a separate clause allowing for attorney’s fees, the essence of the claim is a nuisance tort. No one receives fees in tort actions, and one cannot contract around common law. The court provides a good review of Barmat and prior cases under § 12-341.01 to emphasize that fees are authorized only when the tort could not exist but for the breach of contract.

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The Arizona Supreme Court interprets an insurance clause for non-owned vehicles. Under the policy, an employee operates a non-owned auto “in connection with your business” when using the vehicle while engaged in the employer’s business. To qualify, an employee’s use of a vehicle must be directly involved with, or in furtherance of, an employer’s business purpose and does not include a routine commute to or from an employer’s office. The court states this interpretation is something less than “course and scope,” but doesn’t that depend on how one defines “course and scope”?

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