Judge Eckerstrom’s opinion is a well-considered exercise in statutory interpretation. Pima Community College is not bound by certain of Arizona’s historic preservation laws because it is not a state agency. The historic preservation laws, A.R.S. §§ 41-861-864, apply only to the state and “its agencies.” These statutes do not include political subdivisions, although other statutes impose other historic preservation responsibilities, and one may look there. As for the dilapidated hotels on Drachman, Copper Cactus Inn, El Ranch, and the Frontier, Pima College may move forward with demolishing them and throwing up more concrete boxes.

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Arizona Supreme Court holds that property owners may quiet title to their property after the statute of limitations on a debt runs. The confusion comes from a 1914 case from the Arizona Supreme Court called Provident v. Schwerner. The court, over a hundred years ago, relied upon the notion that equity (clearing title) was not available to a mortgagor when his mortgage debt remained unpaid. In 1941, the legislature enacted A.R.S. § 12-1104, which states that a person may quiet title when the statute of limitations runs on an action to enforce a lien or judgment.  The argument was that a deed of trust is something different and remains even if the statute of limitations on the debt has expired. Provident conflicts with the statute. Under Arizona’s constitution, the common law is subordinated to the legislature. Further, equity cannot upset rights defined by statute. We agree with all of this, but doesn’t it feel strange that in 2025 we are overruling a 1914 Arizona Supreme Court decision by applying a 1941 statute?

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We spoke too soon. On March 25, we discussed vested rights and retroactive statutes, and the next day this case comes out. The Arizona Supreme Court holds that a more recent statutory amendment to the workers’ compensation act, which makes it easier for firefighters to have cancer covered, does not apply because the defense had a vested right under the earlier statute. The defense vested when the plaintiff filed the lawsuit. Yet another reason to re-read Hall.  Justice Montgomery authored a vigorous dissent. He has a different view on when and what rights vests. The “manifest intent” must consider that the statutory amendment was born from Arizona’s constitution and “necessarily operates with the intent and purpose to compensate as many employees as are qualified under the WCA” and “advances the remedial purpose of the WCA.” We got Grammatico goosebumps just reading this.

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