Signing a sticky note “XO” does not satisfy the signature requirement for a valid holographic will. When Jamie Bixby died, she left behind two sticky notes on a coffee table. One note stated: “I’m sorry, I just don’t have the tools for this. Beth gets everything.” The second note stated: Also, sorry universe, thank you for the experience. . . . maybe XO.” The trial court ruled that the purported will lacked a signature. The court of appeals agreed. “XO” is not a signature in the usual sense and is a common abbreviation for “hugs and kisses.” The court of appeals consulted an online dictionary, the Cambridge Dictionary, and the Oxford Dictionary.  An X by itself has been used and accepted as a signature, the court explained, but under those circumstances, the nature of the mark and its context suggested the mark had been placed with “signatory intent.” Since XO does not show signatory intent, the court need not consider “testamentary intent.” Way too much time, energy, and research were spent on drafting this opinion. Reaching an opposite result would have been absurd, so why not write a two sentence decision: “The court below correctly determined that XO written on the bottom of a sticky note does not meet the signature requirement for a holographic will. We agree; judgment affirmed.” 

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The case involves an ATV accident and underinsured motorist coverage. The policy’s UM/UIM coverage excludes off-road vehicles. The uninsured/underinsured motorist statute, A.R.S. § 20-259.01, does not define “motor vehicle.” You may recall from an earlier blog that the court of appeals gave a broad reading and rejected contrary UM case law because the UM/UIM statute distinguishes between UM and UIM coverage. The court of appeals included a side-by-side comparison of the UM and UIM coverage, but the analysis seemed contrived. As pointed out by the supreme court, those are distinctions without a difference. The issue is defining what constitutes a “motor vehicle.” The UM/UIM statutes provide coverage when the tortfeasor either lacks sufficient liability coverage or has no coverage at all. The Financial Responsibility Act mandates liability coverage. The supreme court applies the in pari materia doctrine, meaning related statutes should be read together. The supreme court distinguishes past cases that declined to read the statutes together, holding that the court’s “more recent decisions make clear, though, that in pari materia is a primary tool of interpretation and ambiguity is not a prerequisite to applying it.” By applying the FRA definition of a motor vehicle as vehicles that are registered or required to be registered under Arizona law and operated on a highway, the supreme court concludes that UIM coverage is neither required nor prohibited for off-road vehicles. The policy’s definition excluding off-road vehicles, except while on public roads, is enforceable.

By our count, and we may be wrong, this is the eighth insurance coverage case decided over the past five years. Cravens v. Montano, 567 P.3d 745 (decided April 29, 2025); Staker & Parsons Co. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 551 P.3d 1156 (2024); Franklin v. CSAA Gen. Ins. Co., 255 Ariz. 409 (2023); Columbus Life Ins. Co. v. Wilmington Trust, NA, 255 Ariz. 382 (2023); Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Osborn III Partners LLC, 254 Ariz. 440 (2023); Walker v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 254 Ariz. 17 (2022); and Apollo Educ. Grp., Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 250 Ariz. 408 (2021). Insurance coverage may not be a hot topic for insureds or insurers or the supreme court is disinterested. And when the court decides to wade into the water, the court is not creating any significant waves.

link to opinion