Parents filed suit against the school district under Arizona’s Parents’ Bill of Rights, A.R.S. § 1-602. The case involved a junior high school student who, with the support of the school and the district’s policies, was using a boy’s name instead of her given name. Parents learned of this so-called “in-school gender transition,” objected, and the school initially told the parents that teachers would abide by the parents’ express request that the child be referred to only by her given name.

The court reversed the trial court’s ruling that the case was moot because the child had moved to a different school. The parent still has the right to sue for past interference and to seek declaratory relief to prevent further violations. The school also argued the suit was untimely. The court partially agreed. Although the parents initially learned of the issue more than a year before the suit was filed, the school later falsely reassured them that it would stop. It didn’t, and that second violation triggered a new accrual date. A few cleanup issues: the superintendent was named in her official capacity, making her a redundant defendant; the board member who brought her own claim lacks authority and standing to claim she was denied the right to vote on the policies, which were implemented before she was elected.

We expect more of these lawsuits brought by parents for in-school gender transitions. This is a minefield for schools to navigate, and attorneys have started advertising for these cases. This case is its own advertisement.

link to opinion

We generally do not blog criminal cases, but this one involves A.R.S. 28-672, which imposes a criminal penalty for a violation of certain civil traffic laws, including the red-light statute. The enhanced penalty statute turns a civil traffic violation into a criminal violation when “the violation results in an accident causing serious physical injury or death. . . ”  We emphasize the words ‘”results in”‘ because the opinion depends on them.

The defendant rear-ended a vehicle stopped at a red light. The impact pushed both vehicles into the intersection, resulting in the death of one of the occupants. The Arizona Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Judge Montgomery, held that the enhanced penalty statute does not apply. After consulting dictionaries, including the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, the court concluded that “results in” refers to a sequence of events: first, a moving violation, and then an accident. Since the defendant did not enter the intersection until after the collision, the civil traffic violation did not cause the accident. (This is the second time Montgomery has referenced the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy when interpreting causation.) Justice Bolick authored a vigorous dissent and concluded by urging the legislature to amend the statute, lamenting: “But even if it does, it will be cold comfort to the victim family, which in our view was clearly within the intended protective scope of the enhanced penalty statute.” Such comments are intended to do what?

When determining attorney’s fees in a contract dispute, the prevailing party is entitled to fees under the presumptive “net judgment rule.” The “totality of litigation” and “percentage of success” tests only come into play when there are multiple claims and varied success, cf., Schwartz v. Farmers Ins., 166 Ariz. 33, 38 (App. 1990). The net judgment rule applies even if the jury awards the plaintiff significantly less than what was sought. What is surprising here is that an experienced, now retired, trial judge allowed his indignation over the plaintiff’s litigation to influence his application of the law.