The case involves an ATV accident and underinsured motorist coverage. The policy’s UM/UIM coverage excludes off-road vehicles. The uninsured/underinsured motorist statute, A.R.S. § 20-259.01, does not define “motor vehicle.” You may recall from an earlier blog that the court of appeals gave a broad reading and rejected contrary UM case law because the UM/UIM statute distinguishes between UM and UIM coverage. The court of appeals included a side-by-side comparison of the UM and UIM coverage, but the analysis seemed contrived. As pointed out by the supreme court, those are distinctions without a difference. The issue is defining what constitutes a “motor vehicle.” The UM/UIM statutes provide coverage when the tortfeasor either lacks sufficient liability coverage or has no coverage at all. The Financial Responsibility Act mandates liability coverage. The supreme court applies the in pari materia doctrine, meaning related statutes should be read together. The supreme court distinguishes past cases that declined to read the statutes together, holding that the court’s “more recent decisions make clear, though, that in pari materia is a primary tool of interpretation and ambiguity is not a prerequisite to applying it.” By applying the FRA definition of a motor vehicle as vehicles that are registered or required to be registered under Arizona law and operated on a highway, the supreme court concludes that UIM coverage is neither required nor prohibited for off-road vehicles. The policy’s definition excluding off-road vehicles, except while on public roads, is enforceable.

By our count, and we may be wrong, this is the eighth insurance coverage case decided over the past five years. Cravens v. Montano, 567 P.3d 745 (decided April 29, 2025); Staker & Parsons Co. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 551 P.3d 1156 (2024); Franklin v. CSAA Gen. Ins. Co., 255 Ariz. 409 (2023); Columbus Life Ins. Co. v. Wilmington Trust, NA, 255 Ariz. 382 (2023); Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Osborn III Partners LLC, 254 Ariz. 440 (2023); Walker v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 254 Ariz. 17 (2022); and Apollo Educ. Grp., Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 250 Ariz. 408 (2021). Insurance coverage may not be a hot topic for insureds or insurers or the supreme court is disinterested. And when the court decides to wade into the water, the court is not creating any significant waves.

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We do not discuss the appellate jurisdiction questions entertained by the Arizona Supreme Court but go directly to the duty issue. The Department of Liquor Licenses and Control owed no duty to prevent a bar with a liquor license from overserving its customers. While the Department has specific authority to act under state statutes, the statutes do not require or prohibit certain conduct. “To create a duty, therefore, a statute must regulate the defendant’s conduct in a way that requires or prohibits certain conduct, such that the defendant must conform to a particular standard of conduct. Such a statute provides notice to affected parties about how they must conform their conduct to the requirements of the law.” The statutes here are discretionary. The Department may suspend or revoke a license, may conduct inspections, and may impose civil penalties. Such permissive statutes cannot serve as a basis for a public policy duty. The court also considered statutes imposing liability on those who serve, sell, or furnish alcohol. The court then rejected the thinking that the qualified immunity statute itself supports a duty because the staute states that the gross negligence standard applies to a public entity issuing a license or failing to revoke or suspend a license. The qualified immunity statute does not affirmatively impose a duty. The court gives a nod to the court of appeals’ opinion from almost ten years ago limiting claims against public entities based on broad duties:  Hogue v. City of Phoenix, 240 Ariz. 277 (App. 2016). We blogged that case and discussed the “flip the analysis” point back then.

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We keep reading appellate decisions about this tragedy out of Cochise County. This is the third appellate decision we can recall. Dr. Herrod is a general practitioner and a lay pastor, an LDS bishop, at a church. He learned information as a pastor that father sexually abused his children. The abused children claimed that as a physician and mandatory reporter, he was required to notify authorities even if the information came to him as privileged as a pastor and not while treating either the mother or the abused children. Court of appeals agrees with the trial court rejecting this theory. “Under the express language of the statute, Dr. Herrod had a duty to report only if he developed a reasonable belief of child abuse or neglect “in the course of treating a patient.” § 13-3620(A)(1).” There is a concurrence and dissent. In a nutshell, the dissent would find an expansive common law duty of well-being outside the mandatory reporter statute. The dissent doesn’t care how he learned of the abuse, the abuse impacted his patient’s well-being.

link to opinion