Sanchez v. Maricopa Cnty. (7.21.25)

This is another notice of claim gone wrong. Plaintiffs filed a notice of claim against Maricopa County for the negligence of a sheriff’s deputy. The Arizona Supreme Court does not excuse this mistake, and puts its stamp of approval of 50 years of precedent. Fridena v. Maricopa Cnty., 18 Ariz.App. 527 (App. 1972). A county does not control a deputy sheriff – the elected sheriff does. A sheriff is a separately elected official and is vicariously liable for misconduct of the deputy. While the county has fiscal responsibility, and by statute a sheriff’s liability is considered a “county charge,” fiscal responsibility is not tort responsibility. The Arizona Supreme notes most other courts have followed Fridena except for a few errant federal district judges. It was good to see a reference to J.D. v. Hegyi on the importance of context in statutory interpretation.  That point is missed in a few recent opinions.

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In re Estate of Bixby (D2 7.11.25)

Signing a sticky note “XO” does not satisfy the signature requirement for a valid holographic will. When Jamie Bixby died, she left behind two sticky notes on a coffee table. One note stated: “I’m sorry, I just don’t have the tools for this. Beth gets everything.” The second note stated: Also, sorry universe, thank you for the experience. . . . maybe XO.” The trial court ruled that the purported will lacked a signature. The court of appeals agreed. “XO” is not a signature in the usual sense and is a common abbreviation for “hugs and kisses.” The court of appeals consulted an online dictionary, the Cambridge Dictionary, and the Oxford Dictionary.  An X by itself has been used and accepted as a signature, the court explained, but under those circumstances, the nature of the mark and its context suggested the mark had been placed with “signatory intent.” Since XO does not show signatory intent, the court need not consider “testamentary intent.” Way too much time, energy, and research were spent on drafting this opinion. Reaching an opposite result would have been absurd, so why not write a two sentence decision: “The court below correctly determined that XO written on the bottom of a sticky note does not meet the signature requirement for a holographic will. We agree; judgment affirmed.” 

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Phx. Union High Sch. Dist. No. 210 v. Sinclair (7.15.25)

The Arizona Supreme Court accepts jurisdiction over a special action that was denied by Division One. A high school student was seriously injured while jaywalking across a busy street to get to school. At that time, he was not under the school’s custody or control. Parents sued the school based on the concept of a general duty. The school was aware that students were crossing the street to reach the school, which would cause traffic to back up, and it could have taken steps to mitigate the risk. This duty-based theory, if accepted, would impact schools, churches, business owners, and even homeowners, as they often make suggestions, recommendations, and urgings to a city regarding its streets. None of this changes who controls the street. The court distinguishes Dinsmoor, where it was noted that a school has a “duty to provide a reasonably safe means of ingress and egress.” That statement was made “in the context of illustrating unique circumstances where a risk arises while the student is under school supervision and control, but the risk results in an off-campus injury.” The court refers to other decisions and follows Monroe v. Basis School, Inc., 234 Ariz. 155 (App. 2014), which limits a duty of care to situations when a student is under the school’s supervision or control. The Arizona Supreme Court has spent considerable effort on defining a duty and, most often, driving out foreseeability from analysis. Since Gipson v. Kasey, the Arizona Supreme Court’s duty cases include: Sanchez-Ravuelta v. Yavapai Cnty. (no duty, liquor board), Perez v. Circle K (duty, premises), Avitia v. Crisis Prep. (no statutory duty to report future risk), Cal-Am Props. v. Edais Eng’g Inc (no tort duty between design professionals and project owner), CVS Pharm, Inc. v. Bostwick (no duty between pharmacy and hospital for the opioid crisis), Dinsmoor (no duty to student who was murdered by former boyfriend), Dabush v. Seacret Direct LLC (no premises duty absent possessory interest), Quiroz v. Alcoa Inc. (no duty for take-home asbestos), Sanders v. Alger (patient owes a duty to caregiver), Wilks v. Manobianco (insurance agent owes a duty to procure requested coverage), Guerra v. State (no death notification duty), Nunez v. Prof’l Transit Mgmt. of Tucson (reasonable duty of care owed to passenger by common carrier), Lips v. Scottsdale Healthcare (no tort duty to avoid causing purely economic losses through spoliation of evidence), Flagstaff Affordable Hous. v. Design Alliance (no duty, property owner is limited to contractual remedies), State v. Hicks (state’s duty ends with appointment of competent counsel).

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