The defendant didn’t care about this case; it made no appearance at any stage of it. The plaintiff cared mostly about attorney’s fees — but not those in this case, as only a couple of thousand dollars were at issue. The point, as the court suggests between the lines, was to set an easy-fee precedent for its future cases.

Plaintiff, a homeowners’ association, sued Defendant alleging violations of the CC&Rs. Plaintiff took default judgment and submitted a China Doll affidavit for its fees. The trial court awarded fees but reduced them, finding some of the requested fees excessive. Plaintiff appealed. A non-appearance on appeal is normally a confession of error but Plaintiff wanted a precedent set instead, so that’s what the court did: it reviewed the issue and published but set a precedent opposite to what Plaintiff wanted.

Plaintiff argued that the trial court’s ability to reduce the amount evidenced by a China Doll affidavit is limited when there is no opposition to it. Although that sounds dangerous considering the routine effronteries of China Doll affidavits there is decent support for it in some of the language of the precedent, including China Doll itself. The court has to step around that; not all of its steps are equally deft.

China Doll “authorizes a trial court to adjust a fee award ‘upon the presentation of an opposing affidavit.'” But it didn’t involve a situation where no one was available to file one.

McDowell (App. 2007) said that a China Doll affidavit establishes a “prima facie entitlement to fees in the amount requested.” McDowell was an HOA case involving contractual fees. This opinion distinguishes McDowell on the grounds that the CC&Rs in that case gave the HOA a claim to “all” fees whereas Tucson Estates’ give it a claim to “reasonable” fees.

Which leads the court to a conclusion: in order to ensure that the fee awarded is reasonable the trial court has broad discretion to review the fee request despite lack of an opposition. Otherwise, the intent of the parties to the contract could be frustrated.

This is good policy, the court tells us, because limiting the trial court “would incentivize some prevailing parties to overreach in their fee applications.” No, really?

(The irony is that this plaintiff didn’t, at least not much. Some of the items criticized by the trial court seem a bit overstated but others certainly don’t.)

But wait a minute. Is the court really suggesting that its rule doesn’t apply if the fee agreement says “all”? Can a default judgment include an unreasonable fee if the contract is worded correctly? What about the rule that that’s unethical? Isn’t it also against public policy? And if it is indeed against public policy, what is the legal difference between a contract that says “all” and a contract that says “reasonable”?

(Opinion: Tucson Estates Property Owners Association vs. Estate of Jenkins)