This case about a Morris agreement on a title policy has a very complicated factual background. The court presents it at length. Our summary simplifies, though it does assume knowledge of Morris.

Some investors obtained from a bankrupt lender its deed of trust on a development in Tempe (Centerpoint) and then foreclosed it to take control of the development  itself. They also bought some adjacent property for a parking lot. With these transactions came title policies insuring their interest in the property. So when mechanics’ liens allegedly having higher priority were asserted the investors tendered the defense of those suits to the title insurers, which accepted under reservation. Eventually the investors needed to sell the property in order to pay off additional loans they themselves had taken out on it. They couldn’t do that without clearing the liens but didn’t want to clear the liens for fear of forfeiting their claim that the insurers should do that for them. Instead they came up with a scheme that we were going to make pithy and very witty comments about until we noticed that one of the lawyers in this case brags on his web page that he was its “architect,” in light of which the better part of valor is to let you form your own opinion. The investors formed a separate entity, which they controlled.  They sold the property and had part of the payment diverted to that entity, which used it to purchase the lien claims and an assignment of the lienholders’ rights against the investors. The entity then substituted itself as plaintiff in the lien claims against the investors. Finally, the investors as defendants agreed with the entity (i.e., themselves as plaintiffs) to a Morris deal on the lien claims, with a judgment three times the amount actually used to resolve the liens – which amount, if collected, the entity agreed to pay across to the investors.

When the insurers challenged this the trial court decided it that it was just fine and that, assuming coverage (which had yet to be determined), the insurers would owe the entity the amount of the stipulated judgment. And by finding that nobody had done anything wrong the court foreclosed – and therefore dismissed – claims of intentional interference with contract that the insurers were making. The insurers appealed.

The insurers wanted the court to hold that Morris doesn’t apply to title policies. The court says that it needn’t address that because even if Morris applied to title insurance in general it doesn’t apply here.

The court reviews the background and purpose of Morris agreements and finds that this agreement “falls outside [their] permitted parameters.” The agreement was not made at arms length. The lien claimants, by assigning their rights, “effectively settled their claims unconditionally . . . leaving no risk of excess liability for the insureds.” The amount of the judgment inflated both the amount and nature of the insured’s actual liability and hence of the insurance coverage.

The court therefore also reinstates the claims of intentional interference with contract and remands.

(link to opinion)

This malpractice case breaks no new ground but touches on a few useful practice pointers.

A lady was going to a rehab center for treatment of bone fracture. While there she complained of chest pains and the center’s doctor, an internist, was called to see her. He ordered nitroglycerin; she felt better but died several hours later of heart failure. Her beneficiaries sued. The doctor made several dispositive motions on disclosure and expert-witness issues.

He moved to disqualify the plaintiffs’ expert. The expert was an internist but also a cardiologist, which specialty he had practiced almost exclusively during the previous year. The trial court granted the motion and the Court of Appeals affirms. The opinion treats the issue respectfully but between the lines says  “under the statute (12-2604) this isn’t a tough call.” Plaintiffs made the “more expert” argument – that a cardiologist is an even better expert in a heart case than an internist. This is a misunderstanding – convenient, we’re pretty sure, rather than actual – of the meaning of the statute and of the basis of malpractice liability under current law.

Plaintiffs argued that a position contrary to theirs was “absurd.” The Court of Appeals, too, mentions it in quotation marks, which we hope everyone recognizes as admonishment and advice.

In response to their expert’s disqualification the plaintiffs asked for time to get a new one. The trial court denied it but the Court of Appeals decides that this was an abuse of discretion. Turns out that the defendant had sandbagged, waiting until after the disclosure deadline to raise an issue about the expert. The trial court had presumably put in the balance the fact that after the issue was raised the plaintiffs did nothing about it for months, until they lost the disqualification motion. The opinion does not suggest that that makes any difference once the disclosure deadline passes. We will be interested to see whether the rule that diligence can stop when disclosure does is applied to defendants as well as plaintiffs.

The trial court awarded some attorney’s fees to the defendant because of the plaintiffs’ misleading disclosure about one of the witnesses, the medical examiner who performed the autopsy. The disclosure, which apparently wasn’t cleared with the witness beforehand, said essentially that he would support plaintiffs’ theory of the case, in the course of which it twisted his opinions around and put some of them backwards. The Court of Appeals affirms the sanction. That counsel knew the disclosure to be false and misleading couldn’t be established but he should have known and that was enough.

The court addresses, on the defendant’s cross-appeal (since it would be dispositive if valid),  a summary-judgment argument that the trial court did not agree with. He argued that even if the plaintiffs’ expert were qualified the opinion was speculative. The opinion was that the defendant should have told the decedent’s son that she should go to an emergency room, in which event son would have told mom and mom would have obeyed. In the past mom had variously refused and agreed to medical treatment. How a doctor could read the mind of a patient he never met and how, if that is a medical opinion at all, it is one for a cardiologist are beyond us. But the opinion affirms, saying that an expert can rely on “his or her own years of first–hand experience in a medical practice to formulate opinions as to the probable treatment a patient would receive and the likely outcome.” 

There were a couple of other issues but we skip those as either inconsequential or fact-specific. Remanded to give the plaintiffs another chance to get an expert.

(link to opinion)

This lawsuit against an airport is mildly interesting substantively but for this blog its principal interest is stylistic.

A hot air balloon and a paraglider were participating in a festival at the Cottonwood airport. A quarter-mile from airport, half an hour after taking off,  the paraglider hit the balloon. The folks in the balloon sued the paraglider pilot and the airport; the pilot cross-claimed against the airport (that’s the gist; the litigation was a bit more complex than that but the court’s explanation of it is confused or in any event confusing). The airport moved to dismiss the pilot’s claim, arguing that it had no duty to him. The trial court granted it.

The pilot appealed, arguing that he was an airport invitee. The Court of Appeals holds that the airport’s premises liability existed on the premises but not away from it. The airport didn’t and wasn’t able to control the airspace where the accident happened; neither craft was taking off or landing. The court also mentions that although premises owners must sometimes warn of dangers the danger here – of running into a balloon – was obvious; that seems, though,  the sort of lagniappe courts throw in to support the result rather than a considered attempt to rehabilitate obviousness as a motion defense. Judgment affirmed.

So much for substance; now for style.

The court begins the analysis with a lengthy paragraph explaining the elements of the cause of action  – duty, breach, causation, damages – and what “duty” is. You may recall that a few months ago we were curtly critical of a similar paragraph in Boisson. This opinion’s explanation isn’t as long but is basically similar; for all we know both are cut-and-paste from the same source (especially the first few lines; they’re perhaps too alike to be coincidence). So this wasn’t an oddity of Boisson, this is approved CA1 style. Rather than being snarky about it, then, we should simply put the question: why?

Does the court really think that the lawyers in these cases didn’t understand the basics of the law of negligence? Does it think that of the lawyers who will someday need to look up these cases about off-premises liability? Tax court opinions don’t start by explaining what “taxes” are; why must every negligence case tell us what “negligence” is?  In what circumstance does the court decide that discussion of an area of law must include description of its first principles, most of which have nothing to do with the case at issue? How, in the court’s view, does this aid the discussion?

Well, you know the answers to these questions – which is that the court has never even asked them. And that’s our real gripe: not that the author of an opinion disagrees with us about what ideas are appropriate to it but that the court, content to color by numbers, gives the matter no evident consideration.

(link to opinion)