Donovan v. Yavapai College (CA1 5/31/18)

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We’ve blogged a number of notice-of-claim cases before. This one follows the established pattern: a defendant urging a strained construction of the statute and a plaintiff trying to get by it while saying as little as possible.

A community-college employee was allegedly harmed by mold in her place of employment. Her notice-of-claim letter set out multiple causes of action against multiple public entities but one settlement amount: she would “accept the sum of $450,000 as full and final settlement.” Yavapai College argued that this was defective, that the notice should have set forth a separate settlement amount as to it. Apparently (one has to read between the lines a bit here) the argument was that the stated settlement amount was so large that it must have been a total for several claims against several claimants rather than what the college alone could settle for. The trial court agreed and granted the college summary judgment.

The Court of Appeals reverses. The statute (12-821.01) requires a specific amount for which the case can be settled. Plaintiff’s notice provided that. “The . . . statute does not require that the . . . amount be objectively reasonable.” The defendant may not like that amount, in which case it can try to negotiate a better one, but “the public entity remains assured that, for the specific amount stated (reasonable or otherwise), it can satisfy its liability.”

We don’t mean to be too hard on Yavapai College; its position is understandable but would be better directed to the legislature.

(Opinion: Donovan v. Yavapai)

 

Quiroz v. Alcoa (5/11/18)

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We blogged the Court of Appeals’ opinion here. The majority comes to the same result for mostly the same reasons, which it sums up as follows:

“First, duty is not presumed; in every negligence case, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the existence of a duty. Second, . . . foreseeability is not a factor in determining duty. Third, duty is based on either special relationships recognized by the common law or relationships created by public policy. Fourth, in the context of duty, the primary sources for identifying public policy are state and federal statutes. In the absence of such legislative guidance, duty may be based on the common law — specifically, case law or Restatement sections consistent with Arizona law.”

“Duty is not presumed” means — and this seems to be the main point of the opinon — that the court specifically rejects the attempt of the Third Restatement of Torts to write duty out of the law by presuming it. The court (citing Palsgraf, which had been infra dig for a while) says that “before negligence can be predicated [on] a given act, [in] back of the act must be sought and found a duty to the individual complaining.”

On the issue of public policy the court emphasizes that “in the absence of a statute . . . we exercise great restraint in declaring public policy.” Policy is “primarily a legislative function” and even the court does not establish duties “based on our own notions of appropriate public policy.”

Bales and Pelander dissent, though Pelander apparently does not go so far as to think that Arizona should adopt the Third Restatement.

 

Gonzalez v. Nguyen (4/12/08)

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An important decision on Rule 60(c)(6) (now 60(b)(6)).

Plaintiff took default judgment in a personal-injury case. Defendant then appeared and moved to set it aside under Rule 60(c)(6) (“any other reason justifying relief”), arguing that he wouldn’t contest liability but that the judgment was excessive. The trial court granted the motion. So far, so ordinary; this has for years been a standard insurance-defense argument, one of the few reliable uses of 60(c)(6). But then the Court of Appeals issued a memorandum reversing for lack of meritorious defense or excusable neglect. This wasn’t entirely the Court of Appeals’ fault; the Supreme Court admits that “Rule 60(c)(6) jurisprudence is not a model of clarity or consistency.” So it issues this opinion to straighten things out.

When “the record suggests that the judgment amount is excesssive, a trial court appropriately may provide Rule 60(c)(6) relief.” That the judgment is excessive is a meritorious defense. The showing of it “need not be strong” though it must be “greater than mere speculation.”

Some cases suggest that evidence of the meritorious defense must be extraneous to the judgment record. “We do not find any such requirement in the language or purpose of the rule.” “Rather, if the motion relies on evidence of a meritorious defense that appears in the record, the rule plainly vests authority in the trial court to grant relief, and we disavow language in prior decisions that suggests evidence outside the extant record is necessary.”

Excusable neglect, which is 60(c)(1), isn’t an issue since it and 60(c)(6) are “mutually exclusive.” The latter rule “contemplates circumstances that do not fit into the other . . . subsections.”

The court vacates the lower court’s opinion and affirms the trial court’s order.

(Opinion: Gonzalez v. Nguyen)