In re the Gila River General Adjudication (2/19/10)

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The Arizona Supreme Court took this case as a “special proceeding” for interlocutory review of a ruling by an “adjudication court” on a “motion for summary disposition.”

Sound like the twilight zone? It won’t to old ears but if yours aren’t then welcome to the world of the water cases. This species of permanent litigation has enriched generations of Arizona lawyers. The present opinion, for example, cites cases called Gila River I, Gila River VI, Gila River VII, and maybe some other Gila Rivers we missed.  It has spawned its own rules and procedures, e.g., the 1991 Special Procedural Order that controls this particular sub-species of stream litigation. And it has its own language, which we needn’t go into since if you care about AFYs and rebound calls and the Globe Equity Decree of 1935 and such then you already know what they are. One occasionally suspects, though, that like Jarndyce v. Jarndyce the case isn’t entirely understood by anyone alive – a situation always beneficial to the profession.

Few of the stream opinions neglect to describe their litigation’s tortuous history, often with rueful but passing acknowledgment that it was “complex” twenty years ago. This one also informs us that “much of Arizona is arid desert land” – citing the United State Supreme Court for the proposition, in case you weren’t clear on it.

The case is so complex that, as usual with such cases, procedure trumps substance. This opinion, in the course of 32 pages and 19 often-lengthy footnotes, upholds a settlement agreement involving one party (arrived at in 2005, to show you how quickly these things move) by saying not much more than that the lower court’s order approving it was procedurally correct and that any factual loose ends can be dealt with in the future. It addresses inconsistencies between the special procedural orders in the Gila River litigation and the Little Colorado litigation by saying, in not quite as many words, “we don’t want to talk about that.”

That is the way it manages these cases. Unless kept firmly at bay they would overwhelm. And so, since the only fair way to resolve the facts would be to use dueling pistols, we have developed procedural systems for handling – without ever ending – them, systems that must be preserved at all costs. The judges hope that push doesn’t come to shove until after they’ve retired, the lawyers until after their grandchildren have.

Flagstaff Affordable Housing v. Design Alliance (2/12/10)

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This is an examination and explanation of the economic-loss doctrine. It reverses a Division One opinion we blogged in March 2009.

Design Alliance designed apartments that Flagstaff Affordable Housing built. The design violated federal handicap-accessibility  requirements. FAH was required to remedy the problem at considerable expense so it sued Design Alliance.

Design Alliance moved to dismiss, arguing that the economic-loss rule barred the claim. That rule, as established by the First Division in  Carstens v. City of Phoenix, 206 Ariz. 123, says that there can be no recovery for economic loss absent personal injury or property damage. The trial court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the economic-loss rule does not apply to claims against design professionals. The Supreme Court reverses that, in an opinion meant to be a fairly definitive statement on the economic-loss rule.

Carstens had said that there is no tort recovery of economic loss absent physical harm. This opinion says that that’s what the rule is not. Tort plaintiffs who have no contract with the defendant can and often do seek to recover economic loss. The economic-loss doctrine is a creature of contract law: a contracting party is limited “to contractual remedies for the recovery of economic losses unaccompanied by physical injury to persons or other property.”

This was the law before the Court of Appeals mixed things up in Carstens. But the Supreme Court court seems aware that the real culprit was its opinion in the case that confused the Carstens court: Salt River (143 Ariz. 368). That case held that products liability plaintiffs, who could have both contract and tort claims, can’t get economic loss (assuming that the contract doesn’t permit it) unless there is physical harm caused suddenly and accidently by an unreasonably dangerous product (the “three-factor” test). The court tries to iron out one or two smaller problems with Salt River and then throws doubt on the three-factor test itself, apparently signaling a willingness to change it when an appropriate products case comes along.

In construction-defect cases, the court in effect says that building a building is a more contract-centric thing than buying a product and so allowing tort damages would not be appropriate. Therefore, “when a construction defect causes only damage to the building itself or other economic loss, common law contract remedies provide an adequate remedy.” Economic loss is recoverable only if the contract so provides. The three-factor test does not apply.

As to the Court of Appeals’ holding that the economic-loss rule isn’t involved in claims against design professionals, it is true that the architect owes common-law duties to the owner but they arise because there is a contract between them. There is no valid basis for dealing differently with architects than with other construction contractors.

It is at this point that the court seems to come closest to saying frankly that the very idea of an “economic-loss rule” is misleading. Its simply an aspect of the law of contract damages. To call it a “rule” makes more of it than there is and invites its misinterpretation as a piece of substantive law. That isn’t exactly what the court says, though it may not be a bad way to think about what the court means.

The opinion remands the case to the trial court. It announces an economic-loss rule different from the Carstens rule that the trial judge had; the new rule would allow economic loss if permitted by contract but the contract was not in the record on appeal.

This points up a potential source of confusion. Both this case and a number of Court of Appeals cases following Carstens indicate that the economic-loss rule applies to construction-defect cases. But this opinion means something different by “economic-loss rule;” it holds that the Carstens rule does not apply, overturning or making obsolete the CA cases.

One problem this opinion does not address – the facts did not present it – is the “other property” issue. The court repeatedly points out that the economic-loss rule does apply to claims of physical injury to persons or “other property” – i.e., property other than the product, building, etc. that was the subject of the contract. What “other property” means is not always easy to figure out.

A hat-tip to the court for trying in this and other decisions in the last year or so to address some real trouble-spots in our civil law. And also for citing in this one an oldie but a goodie, Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), which you no doubt remember fondly from law school.

(link to opinion)

Bennett v. Baxter Group (CA2 2/10/10)

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Sometimes you read a case and wonder what the [bleep] was really going on.

Bennett agreed to buy a hotel from Baxter, conditioned on getting financing. He didn’t get it, so Baxter arranged to sell to someone else. Baxter refused to return Bennett’s $10,000 deposit. In retaliation, Bennett recorded his purchase agreement (which of course interfered with the new sale) and refused to release it until he got his money back. They sued each other.

That’s right: having sold a property for $1.7 million, Baxter got greedy about $10,000; Bennett deliberately clouded a title he had no interest in. Seems a shame that either won the case. But, after a bench trial, Bennett did. Baxter appealed.

Most of Baxter’s claims were thrown out on summary judgment; what remained was slander of title (and interference with contract, though having mentioned that the opinion drops it). This claim, the opinion says, was based on A.R.S. 33-420. It grants treble damages against a person who records a “forged, groundless . . . or otherwise invalid” document claiming an interest in title. A document “purporting to create an interest . . . not authorized” by law is presumed groundless. According to the court, Baxter argued that since no law specifically permits the recording of a real estate sales agreement, it was groundless. This is such a dumb argument that the opinion blows it off in a few sentences.

The discussion seems like the typical newspaper report of a trial: accurate bits and pieces assembled wrongly. Was that really what Baxter argued? Didn’t Bennett act precisely for the purpose of making a claim on title – a claim he knew he didn’t have – and precisely for the purpose of blocking another deal until he got what he wanted? Since when must a slander of title claim rely on a statute? Isn’t that a separate claim? What happened to interference with contract?

As for Bennett’s claim, it was based on one 132-word sentence in the contract. (A sentence that long doesn’t just beg for trouble, it grabs trouble by the lapels and double-dares it.) It could be read either as letting Baxter keep the deposit if Bennett didn’t buy the hotel or as letting Baxter keep it only if Bennett didn’t perform “in accordance with” the contract. The difference, apparently, is that getting out of the deal for lack of financing was in accordance with the contract, which would get Bennett the money back. The trial court ruled that the sentence – at least when read in conjunction with a a provision the opinion doesn’t quote – was unambiguous and the Court of Appeals agreed: it meant “in accordance with.”

Was the appellate court’s decision on the contract de novo or did it uphold the trial court’s ruling? Good question; the opinion wants it both ways. And why didn’t either court do the sensible thing and call ambiguous language ambiguous?

Having dealt with mere substance, though, the opinion addresses what takes up about two-thirds of the opinion and at least that much of the court’s thought: costs and attorneys fees. The trial court awarded Bennett a bunch of both.

Baxter argued that a lot of the fees arose out of tort, not contract claims. What do you do when you have both? The trial court applied a case called Ramsey v. Air Meds, which says that a tort claim will “arise out of a contract” only when it could not exist “but for” the contract breach. But it misapplied the case, ruling that but for the contract the tort claims “would” (not “could”) not have been brought. Last year, in Modular Mining Systems,  the Court of Appeals basically threw up its hands at trying to apply Ramsey and simply awarded fees when the issues are “interwoven.”  So the opinion remands to let the trial court cite Modular Mining when it re-awards the fees (the opinion isn’t worded quite that blatantly).

The trial court had also awarded fees because Baxter’s claims were groundless, harassment, not made in good faith. Baxter argued that there were no specific findings to support this. At first the opinion says that the findings include enough bad things to justify fees but then decides that one of those bad things might not have justified some of them so it remands all of them for “reconsideration” (i.e., rewording).

The trial court had awarded all Bennett’s costs. The opinion has to point out that there is a statute on what costs are taxable and that most of Bennett’s weren’t. Wasn’t anybody paying attention?

Finally, Baxter argued that its two shareholders were included in the judgment even though they weren’t parties in the case. They were also not parties to the appeal, so the court decided that it had no jurisdiction to decide whether they could appeal (that’s what it says).

How does that happen? Did that sweet guy Bennett just inadvertently add to his judgment people he had never before bothered to name (and who were therefore not in the existing caption)? Did Baxter’s lawyers catch it in the court below? If not, why not; if so, what did they do about it? And if not, how do you like having to hope that the trial court paid no particular attention to what it was doing?

One more problem with this case: we shouldn’t read an opinion and end up with the suspicion that one party and its lawyers got slammed because someone, somewhere, didn’t like them.

 

(Link to opinion)