Plaintiffs sued the wrong entity. Maricopa County is not vicariously liable for a deputy sheriff’s negligent driving. The party vicariously responsible is the Maricopa County Sheriff as an elected official whose duties are imposed by statute and the Arizona Constitution. The sheriff controls his deputies. The court cites 50 years of precedent including its own memorandum decision from earlier this year. The county’s fiscal accountability for the sheriff’s office including paying salary, expenses, and providing equipment is not the control imposing vicarious liability. The court patiently addresses each of plaintiffs’ arguments, but the dismissal is inevitable. Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to serve the sheriff with a notice of claim under A.R.S. § 12-821, and the court rejects the argument the only “entity” is the county. The sheriff is also an entity. A few minor criticisms. The court’s references other jurisdictions holding a sheriff is an independently elected officer and vicarious liability does not attach to the county. No need. Just stick with Arizona law. There is also little need to bring in federal civil rights cases either. Our second minor suggestion is the time the court spends checking dictionaries. Here, the court checks the word “entity” and whether an entity includes the sheriff. We understand Justice Scalia’s influence. Our readers may recall the spat between MCI and AT&T, when Scalia used four different dictionaries to help define the word “modify.” But dictionaries give choices too. While a sign of a good judge is not to play with words, we are confident in our court of appeals using common sense definitions. Do we really need a reference to Merriam-Webster? Common sense tells us an entity includes a person. Is this not what courts are really saying when they look in dictionaries anyway?

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The Arizona Legislature jumped on the bandwagons driven across the country extending statute of limitations for sexual abuse claims. In 2019, Arizona extended the statute of limitations to twelve years, and the legislature created a window statute for certain otherwise time barred sexual abuse claims. As the window statute was closing at the end of 2021, Boyd filed a notice of claim against the State for sexual abuse by a former female corrections officer in 2001.  He included additional claims against other State employees for threatening him not to “make up any lies” about the correctional officer. A few days after filing his notice of claim, he filed his complaint because the window was closing. The complaint was timely; the issue is whether he could file his complaint before the notice of claim expired, and when his cause of action accrued under the revival statute. The State argued the claim accrued when the legislation enacted the new law. The court holds the window revival statute’s phrase “notwithstanding any other law” means notice of claim accrual is irrelevant. Because Boyd filed his complaint before the window closed, his only obligation was to file a notice of claim first and then a complaint. The court sees the law differently from another panel which held otherwise in a memorandum decision a few months back. The court assures us trial courts should make certain the 60 days remains open if a lawsuit is filed before the 60 days has expired. We now have conflicting decisions from Division One. Although the revival window is closed, we will see if the Arizona Supreme Court decides to review the prior case, this one, or perhaps one of the other lawsuits challenging the revival statute at its core. After all, we know where bandwagons end up.

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Holding: A lienholder is entitled to collect under an auto policy with a standard loss-payable clause despite the insurer rescinding the policy because of the insured’s misrepresentations. But no one knows whether this insurance policy between the lienholder and insurer includes such a clause. When the lender filed this declaratory judgment action, the lender did not include the policy. The trial court dismissed the case on a motion to dismiss and cited a rescission letter attached to the insurer’s opposition.  No, procedurally one should not do this, and a court should not use such evidence without this becoming a motion for summary judgment.

No one seems to be thinking. This opinion is a reminder to read the policy. And, if you are filing a case dispositive motion, follow the rules. This embarrasses everyone when the court must re-educate attorneys on motion practice.