Perez v. Circle K (D1 4.9.24)

Someone wasn’t paying attention in tort class. But then again, Cardozo and Andrews’s views in Palsgraf compete not only with each other, but hundreds of cases since including the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in Gibson v. Kasey.

Perez tripped and fell over a case of water at the end of an aisle. She admitted if she would have looked down, she would have seen it. The court of appeals affirms summary judgment by focusing on “duty.” The court holds that whether a duty exists depends on a relationship and the presence of “an unreasonable risk of harm.” In determining duty, the court determines the legal relationship and the “reasonableness of the circumstances as necessary in determining duty.” The court of appeals decides there is no duty because the case of water was not unreasonably dangerous.  What? Let’s assume that the trial court decided differently and held there was a duty. What would the defendant say about that? Isn’t the court of appeals doing what it says it cannot do: defining duty in terms of foreseeable risk. The concurrence has a better analysis. The issue is breach and not duty.

here is the link

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Yanez v. Sanchez (D1 4.9.24)

People play out their lives in social media.  Divorce court tells father to stop posting on social media information about their older child after posting a video of the child experiencing a seizure. Father said this was an attempt to find help for the child’s condition.  The court of appeals holds the divorce court violated the First Amendment. Prior restraint requires evidence of actual or threatened physical or emotional harm to the child. “We appreciate the superior court’s thoughtful desire to protect unrepresented children caught in the middle of warring parents, but specific evidence of harm is required to overcome a parent’s right to free speech.”

here is the link

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Satamian v. Great Divide Ins. et al. (4.9.24)

This opinion is a basic white paper telling practitioners when a cause of action accrues. On negligent procurement and promissory estoppel, the Court holds a cause of action accrues when an insured incurs its own litigation costs in defending an uncovered claim. Simple enough. But there are ways getting around a statute of limitations including the discovery rule. Satamian argued that until he obtained the claim file, he did not know that the excluded watercraft had been identified by the agent. The Court disagrees. A cause of action accrues when plaintiff knows of should have known the what and who elements of causation. The insured knew “who” its agent was from the beginning. When the defense was not picked up, the plaintiff knew what wrong occurred with resulting damages. When an insured incurs costs defending against an uncovered claim, the cause of action accrues and applies to both negligent procurement and promissory estoppel. Under promissory estoppel, a detriment occurs when coverage is denied, and the insured is forced to fund its own defense.  

The Court further knocks down Satamian’s contention that the “final judgment accrual rule” in bad faith cases applies to its negligence and promissory estoppel claims. The final judgment accrual rule in third-party bad faith is limited to cases “in which the alleged injury was exclusively an adverse litigation decision.” The final judgment rule applies in first-party bad faith cases because a final denial is necessary to establish the existence of bad faith. Finally, the Court mentions the assignment to Satamian does not change the analysis because after the assignment, Satamian stands in the shoes of the insured. The Court includes the usual cases we see on accrual: Walk v. Ring, 202 Ariz. 310 (2002); Doe v. Roe, 191 Ariz. 313 (1998); Lawhon v. L.B.J. Inst. Supply Inc., 159 Ariz. 179 (App. 1988); Amfac Distrib. Corp. v. Miller, 138 Ariz. 152 (1983); Com. Union Ins. v. Lewis & Roca, 183 Ariz. 250 (App. 1995); Ariz. Mgmt. Corp. v. Kallof, 142 Ariz. 64 (App. 1984), etc. 

In denying a request for fees, the Court explains it reviewed this case because of its “unique context involving negligent procurement claims, Arizona’s accrual jurisprudence has not been a paragon of clarity; and second, relatedly, RPS and the lower courts erroneously adopted inapposite bad faith jurisprudence to resolve the accrual issues in this case.” A mouthful of words. Not sure what the Court means by “erroneous adopted inapposite bad faith jurisprudence” since each of the lower courts also considered and rejected Satamian’s arguments.

here is the link

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