BNSF Railway v. Buttrick (CA1 12/29/11)

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This discovery dispute involves the extent of a trial court’s jurisdiction over a related administrative proceeding.

The plaintiff, Crain (Buttrick is John Buttrick, the Maricopa County judge; this is a special action), was a railroad employee injured on the job. He sued the railroad under the FELA. His union’s collective bargaining agreement with BNSF requires injured employees to submit certain medical notices regularly. After he filed suit Crain stopped doing so. BNSF scheduled an administrative hearing into this “misconduct” by its employee, under procedures authorized by federal railway-labor law and the contract. Crain countered with a motion for protective order asking the court to rule that BNSF couldn’t require the notices or discipline him for not submitting them. The trial court ruled that he didn’t have to submit them but could be disciplined if he didn’t participate in the hearing. He didn’t; BNSF fired him and filed this special action.

The Court of Appeals holds that the administrative proceedings, “which are conducted under the auspices of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-164, fall outside the scope of actions that the superior court is granted jurisdiction to entertain.”

The parties apparently argued the case on the basis that the Act either did or didn’t preempt State authority. The Court of Appeals says that preemption is not the issue because all that’s in the state court is a personal-injury case, not the regulated employment matters. “The pertinent question, therefore, is not what the court can and cannot do under the Railway Labor Act, but whether the trial court’s jurisdiction extends to the conduct of an independent proceeding with a dignity of its own.” The answer is no, the court can’t interfere with the administrative proceedings any more than the administrative hearing officer could interfere with the court case. “Although Arizona courts have broad powers, both express and inherent, to control the course of their own proceedings, those powers do not create jurisdiction to control independent proceedings conducted under the authority of a separate sovereign.”

Along the way the court says that Crain had produced all “necessary documents” required by the Rules of Civil Procedure but that BNSF’s insistence on contractual notices was not a “mere pretext” for getting more because it needed information regarding possible accommodations for Crain’s alleged disabilities. The court did this as a further, and unnecessary, way to distinguish one of Crain’s cases. The impulse is one we see from time to time: to insist that justice, not merely law, is on your side. (That the two must be the same – and that if they are not then we might as well retire all the judges and go back to being ruled by tribal elders – is a point sometimes elusive.) But the court makes clear that its holding is based on law, not facts. If a court doesn’t have jurisdiction then logically it would seem to be for the administrative proceeding to decide whether a contractual request is proper.

(link to opinion)

Ochser v. Funk (12/21/11)

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We reported the Court of Appeals opinion here. The Supreme Court “granted review to consider the scope of qualified immunity in the context of arrests made pursuant to a facially valid but quashed warrant.” The court upholds the summary judgment but vacates the Court of Appeals’ opinion.

It agrees with the Court of Appeals’ minority that “that when . . . law enforcement officers arrest someone pursuant to a warrant and are confronted with readily available information that objectively casts genuine doubt on the warrant’s validity, the officers must undertake further reasonable inquiry.” Although “officers do not violate that standard . . . if further inquiry on the warrant’s validity would be difficult, time-consuming, or would jeopardize officer safety” the court finds that these officers should have done so (not merely that there was a question of fact about it).

But it concludes that this was not clear at the time, so the officers have qualified immunity.

The court took the case to make law about how to serve an arrest warrant. It says “We hold, and clearly establish prospectively” that law. Actually, as the court seems backhandedly to acknowledge, it is dicta  — which is why the Court of Appeals didn’t bother to conclude that analysis – but, the Supreme Court being supreme, calling it a holding suffices to make it such.

The opinion is by Justice Pelander and so proceeds in small steps, each supported by a lengthy – almost stream-of-consciousness – explanation, with detailed discussion of each and every case.

(link to opinion)

State v. Eddington (12/20/11)

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This is a criminal case but the point the court makes about jury selection can apply in civil cases as well.

One of the jury panelists in this murder trial was a deputy in the Sheriff’s department that investigated the crime. He therefore knew many of the witnesses. Defendant moved to strike him for cause; the trial judge refused after getting a “yes” to the usual can-you-be-fair-and-impartial question.

The majority of the Court of Appeals thought that wrong but affirmed because the defendant had used a peremptory strike on the deputy, who thus had not helped to decide the case.

The State nevertheless petitioned for review. The Supreme Court took the case but then affirmed the Court of Appeals. So, all anybody wanted to do here was to make a point about jurors.

The criminal rule requires dismissal of prospective jurors who can’t be fair and impartial. But there is also a statute on juror selection, 21-211, that disqualifies, among others, not only those who are biased or prejudiced but also those “interested directly or indirectly in the matter under investigation.” Interest must therefore be something different from bias or prejudice. The court cites cases involving financial interest but then says “an interest under A.R.S. § 21-211(2) is not limited to pecuniary concerns.” The deputy could have an interest because law enforcement is seen as part of the “prosecution team.” But – and this is the part that affects civil cases – a co-worker also might not want to question the credibility of witnesses he has to face at work and he might know things about them or the circumstances of the case that aren’t in the record.

The court says that perhaps the trial judge was right in finding the deputy fair and unbiased. But “if the defendant’s jury had consisted of twelve [such deputies], the public likely — and the defendant undoubtedly — would reasonably perceive that a fair trial had not been had, even if all the jurors had sworn during voir dire that they could be fair and impartial.” That’s a test we bet lawyers will remind trial judges of from now on.

(link to opinion)