Good grief. 

Eazy bonded an accused who jumped. Eazy’s President – a non-lawyer – appeared at the forfeiture hearing, argued the matter, and then obtained a couple of continuances. When the judge finally ruled against Eazy she was told that she could move for reconsideration or appeal. A lawyer filed the motion and the appeal.

The Court of Appeals held that since she wasn’t a lawyer Eazy hadn’t technically “appeared” in the forfeiture proceedings and therefore couldn’t, as a matter of law, have made the showing necessary to avoid forfeiture. (Eazy is apparently a corporation, though you have to read between the lines a bit to reach that conclusion.)

Eazy’s lawyer asked the court to publish this to give “guidance” to trial courts, some of which have apparently been letting bail bond employees appear for their companies.

Kudos to him for that. But, like we said, good grief. Lawyers have been chastised for years about UPL. Heaven forefend that someone take a phone call from a guy who turns out to be a public adjuster, for example. The document-preparer committee spends most of its time, and rightly so, riding herd on preparers who think they can give legal advice. And yet the Court of Appeals has to “guide” judges not to let bondsmen make court appearances?

Pardon us hereafter if we yawn about UPL. Get your own house in order first.

There are one or two subplots but this was published to talk about unjust enrichment.

Loiselle’s employee convinced him to lend money to defendant CMG: $25,000, to be repaid in one week along with a $10,000 “loan fee.” Sounds like a Nigerian email but Loiselle was apparently shocked, shocked to find out that it was a scam. The employee owed CMG money and used the $25,000 to reduce his debt and to convince CMG to loan him $21,000 more. He then committed suicide. Loiselle asked for his money back; CMG refused; Loiselle sued for unjust enrichment. The trial court ordered CMG to return the $25,000. CMG appealed.

The Court of Appeals agreed that CMG had been “unjustly” enriched even though it hadn’t done anything wrong. It was enough that Loiselle had made a “mistake.” A mistaken person “is not precluded from maintaining an action for restitution merely because the benefit was conferred due to his lack of care,” quotes the court from the Restatement, its only reference to Loiselle’s evident lack of foresight or common sense. The court also points out that the employee purported to act as CMG’s agent, which the Restatement may say means something in equity even though (the court does not point out) there was no apparently agency at law.

CMG’s fall-back position was that a subsequent change of circumstance – namely, loaning the employee another $21,000 – made repayment of the full amount inequitable. The Court of Appeals, after five pages of parsing the Restatement and some cases, allowed as how that might be so. It remanded to let CMG try to prove that various sections of the Restatement might let it keep $21,000 of the $25,000 (but only if it also shows that it can’t get the money from the employee’s estate, a requirement the court said did not bind Loiselle).

So, a legitimate creditor must repay money innocently received in order to protect a rank speculator from loss.

In recent decades the Restatement has come off the rails but trusty old things like the 1937 Restatement of Restitution that this court used are wonderful guides. The problem is that even in those days the professors were inclined to treat equity as if it were law, creating ever-finer rules and sub-rules so that any case could be decided by reading their book. It is possible, among all those trees, to lose the forest. This is not so much the appellate court’s fault; it isn’t in the business of second-guessing the details of equitable rulings (not in normal civil cases, anyway). But its too bad that the Court of Appeals played along, taking a microscope to Restatement paragraphs rather than pointing out that the touchstone of equity is, well, equity.

THIS OPINION HAS BEEN VACATED

The issue here is whether an assignment to a minor tolls the statute of limitations.

DeSela was injured at school in November 2004. Her mother assigned to her the mother’s claim for her medical expenses. (The validity of the assignment was not at issue but the court feels fidgety enough about it to explain in a footnote why such an assignment is valid.) DeSela then filed a timely notice of claim against the District. In December 2007 she filed suit for personal injury, having turned 18 a year before. The District argued that the claim for medical expenses was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court agreed and dismissed it. (Whether “dismissal” of some damages – or “summary judgment,” as the Court of Appeals calls it – is actually either of those things is a question for another day.) This opinion reverses.

DeSela contended that when her mother assigned the claim to her it was then tolled because she was a minor. The District argued that the assignor stands in the shoes of the assignee and can’t get more than the assignor possessed. This argument, right or wrong, deserves better treatment than it gets at the hands of this opinion.

The court first says that some cases from other jurisdictions – which of course have different statutes – have allowed similar things.

It next cites a statute that might support either side and blows it off with one questionable sentence. An assignment does not affect an existing defense, 44-144. The statute doesn’t apply, says the court, because the District did not have a statute of limitations defense when the assignment was made. But the right not to be sued beyond the statute existed at the moment the accident happened. Does a defense not “exist” because it is contingent on what the claimant does? If that’s the law then explain why or cite a case, don’t just assume your conclusion.

The court next distinguishes several cases because none of them was a spotted horse.

Is the court sure of itself? Twelve footnotes in fourteen pages says “no,” as does the court’s final argument, that last refuge of all appellate courts: policy. Barring the claim “would serve no identifiable public purpose” since its easier for the plaintiff to sue this way, DeSela sent a timely notice of claim anyway, and the claim isn’t stale because the District knew about it. This does nothing but try to justify the court’s conclusion; the legal content is zero. Limitations statutes are not for ease of suing and are not nullified by notice, statutory or otherwise.

In a footnote, the court had addressed an issue the District raised for the first time at oral argument. Why address it? We don’t know; the reason the court gives is incomprehensible. In any event, a supervening disability does not affect the limitations period, 12-503. This does not apply, the court says, because DeSela did not have a supervening disability – she was a minor even before the assignment. But if you’re going to talk about policy, that announced by 12-503 is at least as clear and cogent as anything raised in this opinion.