“We . . . hold that the time to renew an amended judgment runs from the time the amended judgment is entered.” Well, no, that’s a truism, not a holding. The real holding is that “such renewal is effective as to all relief granted in the amended judgment.”

A court entered a money judgment and then, several months later, entered an amended judgment that added attorney’s fees resulting from a motion for new trial and, also, “consolidated all previous awards.” The judgment holder timely renewed the amended judgment but not the original. The judgment debtor filed this action for declaratory judgment, seeking a ruling that only the additional amounts added in the amended judgment were collectible. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings; the debtor took special action.

The Court of Appeals accepts review but denies relief. The legal issue is, its says, “straightforward”: the effect of a judgment is “ascertained by a construction of its terms,” the amended judgment said that it incorporated the original and therefore it did, and thus its renewal renews the whole thing.

The judgment debtor actually had an argument, based on a Hawaii case. The court mentions it in a footnote, reserving the body of the opinion for criticism of the debtor’s position. But the Hawaii renewal statute specifically applies to the “original judgment” so the case is distinguishable.

The court holds that “timely renewal of an amended judgment serves to renew all components of the amended judgment, even if renewal of an earlier judgment would be time-barred.”

The court feels that to insist on renewal of “all previous judgments” would be a “convoluted requirement.” It was too convoluted for this judgment creditor, who had tried to renew the original judgment but managed to foul up the paperwork. But for those who can clear that hurdle it is of course safer to renew them all. Its just a matter of time before someone relies on this case but has forgotten to write the second judgment so as to include the first. The procedural implications of rolling up judgments seriatim – which is the only truly convoluted part of this –  are problems for another day.

(Opinion: Schlussel v. Gerlach)

Discussing the negligence of a parking valet.

Defendant runs the valet parking at a hotel. It released a Porsche to a man who demanded it but who had no claim ticket or I.D., who was in fact stealing it, and who was high on drugs. He drove away and caused a serious accident with Plaintiffs, who sued Defendant (along with its employee and principal) alleging negligence and negligent entrustment. Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiffs hadn’t properly pleaded that it knew or should have known that the driver was on drugs and that it had no duty to Plaintiffs. The trial court granted the motion.

On the issue of duty the argument by Plaintiff’s was that Restatement (Third) 7 should apply.  But Division One rejected the same argument last year in Alcombrack so it affirms dismissal of the negligence claim.

On the negligent entrustment claim it reverses. The Complaint did allege specifically that the driver was on drugs and that Defendant “should have known” that he was impaired. Defendant’s argument, it seems, was that the Complaint should have alleged the specific facts by which it could have known that. But there was “no real dispute that the complaint put [Defendant] on notice of the claim” and the law does not require more. The court doesn’t express any annoyance at the argument, though, so it must have been a closer question than it seems and not just the sort of useless, time-wasting, fee-generating, hyper-pedantic game playing that it sounds like.

Defendant also argued that negligent entrustment shouldn’t apply to valet parking. It cited cases from other jurisdictions holding that a valet must return a car to its owner even if he’s impaired. The court points out that giving the car to someone else instead is “a distinction that matters.” Defendant also contended, in an argument it teased out of sentence in a California case involving police, that a valet has only “transitory” control of the car and not, apparently, controlling control or whatever other species of control it is that can give rise to a claim for negligent entrustment. But Defendant was a bailee and bailees have “sole custody and control.” Defendant doesn’t seem to have made much mention of the law of bailments, perhaps because that law would require of it things  like “ordinary care.”

Defendant made an argument under Restatement (Second) 390 that we will skip because it tempts us to write another sentence full of hyphens. And it argued that because people aren’t liable to the victims of those who steal their cars it shouldn’t be liable to the victims of those it gives cars to. This is another distinction that the court feels makes a difference.

(Opinion: Verduzco v. American Valet)

This case concerns the grounds for common-law indemnity.

Solomon did water/sewer construction on Hatch’s property. The work caused run-off that damaged the property of a neighbor, who sued them both. Settlement talks ensued; the statute of limitations ran but talks continued. Hatch settled the case. Hatch then brought this action against Solomon for indemnity. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment; the trial court gave judgment for Hatch and against Solomon. Solomon appeals.

The Court of Appeals affirms. Solomon’s argument was that since the statute had run Hatch hadn’t satisfied a common obligation. The court distinguishes to different situations: where one pays a common obligation that should have been paid by the other and where one pays a common obligation created by the fault of the other. Under the Restatement, in the second situation – which applies here – one who justifiably believes himself under a duty to pay the underlying claim can get indemnity even if the other party had a defense to it. Hatch maintained that a duty still existed because the case could have been re-filed and pulling out of the settlement would have triggered further litigation; Solomon didn’t dispute that and so the court accepts it (though, reading between the lines, seems to realize that it’s a bit dubious).

Solomon also argued that Hatch can’t get indemnity because it, too, was at fault: it didn’t get the required ADEQ approval for the work and so was negligent per se. But while failure to get the permit might be “but for” causation the only proximate cause of the damage was Solomon’s sloppy work. Hatch’s failure to get approval didn’t cause that (which is what the court means although at one point it phrases things, if not backwards, at least a trifle sideways).

We omit one or two minor arguments that were strictly fact-related.

(Opinion: Hatch Development v. Solomon)