Applying the doctrine of comity and illustrating once again that an appellate court can affirm for any reason.

Plaintiff and Defendant were truckers working for a New Jersey company. While traveling together, Defendant driving, they were injured in an accident in Arizona. Both applied for and received workers comp in New Jersey. Plaintiff then sued Defendant in Arizona; Defendant’s whereabouts were unknown, he was served by publication, and his liability insurer intervened on his behalf. The insurer moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Under the law of either state workers comp would be an exclusive remedy for an employee and the court concluded that New Jersey’s determination that Plaintiff was an employee (which in that state he had alleged and admitted) was res judicata. Plaintiff appeals.

The Court of Appeals affirms, though it changes the reasoning. Res judicata can’t apply because the parties weren’t the same; neither Defendant nor his liability carrier were parties to Plaintiff’s workers comp claim. The court instead applies the doctrine of comity, which is that “courts of one state . . . will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another state . . . , not as a matter of obligation, but out of deference and mutual respect.” The trial court may therefore, in its discretion, “accord the laws and decisions of another state ‘presumptive validity, subject to rebuttal’.”

Plaintiff argued that he was really an independent contractor – that New Jersey had made a “mistake” – but he had applied for workers comp, had done nothing to set aside the award, and hadn’t given the money back. “No compelling reason exists not to defer to . . . New Jersey.” Plaintiff also argued that this was a question of fact that prevented summary judgment but “[i]f materials submitted to a trial court raised genuine issues of material fact concerning subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court may nonetheless determine them” if they are not intertwined with the merits.

(Opinion: Gnatkiv v. Machkur)

Holding that the issuer of a public payment bond can’t be sued for bad faith.

S&S was a subcontractor on a street-maintenance job for the City of Prescott. The general had obtained a payment bond, as required by the Little Miller Act (34-222), from Berkley. When S&S didn’t get paid it made a claim against the bond. Berkley asked for information and said it would investigate; its letters contained boilerplate to the effect that it was not waiving any rights. Nineteen months later, having heard nothing more, S&S sent another demand letter. But by this time – guess what? –  the statute of limitations on its claim had expired (34-223 specifically says one year) and so Berkley denied it. S&S sued for breach of contract and bad faith; the trial court dismissed both; S&S appealed the bad-faith issue.

The Court of Appeals affirms, declining to add bad faith to the statutory scheme. 34-222 says that “all liabilities on this bond shall be” determined by statute. “When a corporate surety undertakes an obligation on a bond pursuant to a specific statutory requirement, its liabilities are measured by the terms of that statute.” The statute provides an adequate remedy which S&S, by letting the statute run, failed to take advantage of. S&S had a somewhat analogous case but it involved a private performance bond, not this statute.

(Opinion: S&S v. Berkley)

Arizona has codified the doctrine that a murderer cannot inherit from his victim, 14-2803. Here the victims try to use the statute to inherit from the murderer.

Husband killed Wife and Children and then himself. Wrongful-death actions against his estate followed, along with an action by various creditors Husband had embezzled from. After large judgments were entered in all, the wrongful-death claimants (i.e., the victims’ estates) moved for a constructive trust on Husband’s estate under 14-2803K, which provides for a trust on a killer’s “property or estate,” effective at the time of the murder, to secure the payment of damages. The point was of course to give their judgments priority over that of the creditors, effectively barring the creditors’ claim (there wasn’t enough money to go around) and allowing them to take the whole estate via their judgment claims. The probate court denied the motion; they appeal.

The Court of Appeals affirms, on a narrow point of statutory construction. 2803F says that the fact of the required “felonious and intentional killing” can be established by a criminal conviction or the court can find it by a preponderance. But 2803K says that the trust is based on acts that “pursuant to subsection F . . . resulted in a criminal conviction.” We might have called that an ambiguity but the court says that the reference to subsection F is to the “felonious and intentional” requirement and that subsection K says specifically that in order to get a trust you can only prove that with a conviction.

There were also arguments about the statute’s effect on creditors but, having resolved the case, the court declines to reach them.

(opinion: In re Estates of Butwin)