The third case in six months or so on calculating a supersedeas bond.

AOR sued to collect on a promissory note. It won damages, costs, and fees. Defendant appealed. It asked that the supersedeas bond be the amount of damages awarded AOR less the amount of a bond it had posted as a provisional remedy and also less the amount of attorney’s fees that had been awarded it against AOR in a separate action. The trial court agreed. AOR took special action, arguing that under the statute and Rule 7 the bond must equal the damages.

The Court of Appeals takes jurisdiction and grants relief. AOR had taken down the provisional-remedy bond and used it, with Defendant’s agreement, to cover some of its attorney’s fees. Because it was used to cover a part of the judgment that the statute and rule don’t include in the supersedeas bond, using it to reduce that bond was wrong. In addition, although Rule 7 allows “other security” to be considered when setting a supersedeas bond the trial court did not do so. The opinion emphasizes this repeatedly as a reason for its ruling – that, apparently, the trial court’s order didn’t specifically say that it considered the first bond to be “other security” under Rule 7. Could it properly have done so? How would the case change if it had? The opinion does not say.

As for the attorney’s fees in the separate case, the statute and rule do not provide that a supersedeas bond can be reduced by elements of a judgment in another action. 

Defendant argued that the trial court was taking into account cash that AOR had received in order to maintain the status quo. Rule 7 allows the court to use an order “in lieu of or in addition to” the supersedeas bond” to “preserve the status quo.” But that’s a separate thing from figuring the amount of the bond and doesn’t change its calculation, which is controlled by other provisions of the Rule.

The opinion is not a model of clarity. Its one of those in which the meaning – once you’ve figured it out – explains the language used rather than the other way around. But we have to give it at least a couple of stars since there are no footnotes.

(Opinion: AOR v. Bustamante)

These are twelve appeals consolidated sua sponte so that the court can address a supposed question of its jurisdiction. “The question presented in these appeals is whether language contemplated by Rules 54(b) or 54(c) is required for a ruling to be appealable other than as a “final judgment” under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).” We don’t know why.

A “final judgment” is appealable; that’s 12-2101(A)(1). To signal that a judgment is “final” Rule 54 requires special language: that in 54(c) when the judgment applies to all parties and issues, that in 54(b) when it doesn’t. But of course various other rulings are also appealable under other parts of 12-2101 and other statues. “The issue is whether such rulings may be appealed to this court even though they are not “final judgments” and are not entered under Rule 54(b) or 54(c).”

Well, no. The issue can’t involve whether they’re appealable “even though they are not ‘final judgments.’” The statues make them appealable; that’s not an issue for the court. What the court means is only the last part – whether these other types of rulings are appealable even if they don’t have Rule 54(b)/(c) language.

The court does not explain how Rule 54 could limit the operation of statutes. In any event, the purpose of Rule 54 language is to signal finality. So why does the court feel that there’s an issue about whether it applies to rulings that are not final? Your guess is as good as ours. There’s no indication that any of the parties in these cases thought it an issue. 

The court does not explain why, Rule 54(b) having been in effect for 55 years (54(c) became effective in 2014), it didn’t before spot this “issue” of its application. Except that it did, 49 years ago: “an interlocutory order which is made appealable by statute does not require” Rule 54(b) language, Bulova (1967). The court cites Bulova in passing but not that part of it. (Possibly the court’s thinking is that the quote was dictum since Bulova dealt only with appeal from denial of a preliminary injunction whereas the point of lashing these appeals together was to provide the basis for a broad holding. That doesn’t explain why it felt necessary a broad holding on a non – and rather silly – issue.)

After several pages of elementary and largely repetitive “analysis,” complete with Division One’s beloved discursive footnotes, here’s the bottom line: Rule 54(b)/(c) apply only  – surprise! – to things that are final: to final judgments under 12-2101(A)(1) and also to probate appeals and to appeals from review of administrative decisions, both of which must by statute be “final.”

The court then disposes of each of the appeals. The only oddity is an appeal from denial of a Rule 60(c) motion, appealable as a special order after final judgment; the appeal is dismissed because the underlying judgment wasn’t final – it didn’t have Rule 54 language. Which means that it should have been dismissed anyway, even if not part of this consolidated appeal and even if this opinion had never been written. 

(Opinion: Brumett v. MGA)

This involves relation back of an amended Complaint when somebody sued the insurer instead of the insured.

Plaintiff and Defendant were in a car accident. Plaintiff made a claim against Defendant’s carrier, State Farm. One day before the statute of limitations ran she filed, pro se, an action for her injuries – but she filed it against State Farm. When State Farm moved to dismiss she got a lawyer, who amended her Complaint to substitute the proper defendant. That defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the amended Complaint did not relate back. The trail court granted the motion; Plaintiff appealed.

The Court of Appeals reverses. Two of the three requirements for relation back under Rule 15(c) were agreed upon: the new Complaint related to the same occurrence and State Farm, whose knowledge is imputed to the defendant, knew of the lawsuit within the time for filing and service. The question was therefore whether the defendant (through State Farm) knew or should have known that Plaintiff had made a mistake “concerning the identity of the proper party.” Defendant argued that Plaintiff knew who she was, could have sued her, and sued her insurance company instead by choice, a deliberate decision. The court quotes from a U.S. Supreme Court opinion to the effect that knowing who people are but misunderstanding their roles in the matter is a “mistake” under the rule. The original Complaint alleged that State Farm had “assumed full responsibility for its insured’s actions,” which indicates mistake as to its role, not a strategic decision.

Unfortunately, the court goes on to suggest that a pro se plaintiff can be cut some slack in deciding on the proper party. It cites an order from an  Illinois federal District Court case. It also cites a paragraph from an Arizona case and does so both incorrectly (the wrong paragraph number; at least unless the court slips in one of its unannounced corrections-opinions the end of its paragraph 18 says “supra ¶ 10” rather than “supra ¶ 19”) and misleadingly (the paragraph in question has nothing to do with a pro-se issue). The rules mean nothing if pro se parties can be forgiven mistakes because they are pro se and there is no good reason here to suggest any exception to that. The court had already decided that Plaintiff’s misunderstanding of “crucial facts” resulted in a “mistake in identity.” It goes on to show, albeit not very clearly, that the real question is what the defendant knew or should have known, and that State Farm should have known perfectly well that Plaintiff was mixed up.

We assume that the lawsuit involves possible excess liability, which would explain why State Farm pursued this issue. Or maybe somebody really, honestly thought that something made this case genuinely different from the other ten thousand times that a pro se has filed at the last minute and named the insurance company. Otherwise, this is a shame. Do reasonable defense counsel advise reasonable companies that reasonable, and reasonably knowledgeable, courts will allow amendment and that fighting it would do nothing but make money for that defense counsel? If they didn’t then this opinion wouldn’t have needn’t to be published, nor even written, since a prior one would have settled the issue fifty years ago.

(Opinion: Flynn v. Campbell)