We generally do not blog criminal cases, but this one involves A.R.S. 28-672, which imposes a criminal penalty for a violation of certain civil traffic laws, including the red-light statute. The enhanced penalty statute turns a civil traffic violation into a criminal violation when “the violation results in an accident causing serious physical injury or death. . . ”  We emphasize the words ‘”results in”‘ because the opinion depends on them.

The defendant rear-ended a vehicle stopped at a red light. The impact pushed both vehicles into the intersection, resulting in the death of one of the occupants. The Arizona Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Judge Montgomery, held that the enhanced penalty statute does not apply. After consulting dictionaries, including the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, the court concluded that “results in” refers to a sequence of events: first, a moving violation, and then an accident. Since the defendant did not enter the intersection until after the collision, the civil traffic violation did not cause the accident. (This is the second time Montgomery has referenced the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy when interpreting causation.) Justice Bolick authored a vigorous dissent and concluded by urging the legislature to amend the statute, lamenting: “But even if it does, it will be cold comfort to the victim family, which in our view was clearly within the intended protective scope of the enhanced penalty statute.” Such comments are intended to do what?

When determining attorney’s fees in a contract dispute, the prevailing party is entitled to fees under the presumptive “net judgment rule.” The “totality of litigation” and “percentage of success” tests only come into play when there are multiple claims and varied success, cf., Schwartz v. Farmers Ins., 166 Ariz. 33, 38 (App. 1990). The net judgment rule applies even if the jury awards the plaintiff significantly less than what was sought. What is surprising here is that an experienced, now retired, trial judge allowed his indignation over the plaintiff’s litigation to influence his application of the law.

This is a special action. Plaintiffs are indicted partly based on the State’s forensic expert testimony before the grand jury. The indictments are later dismissed, and Plaintiffs file suit against the State and its investigators. They allege the defendants, including the forensic expert, fabricated evidence to secure the indictments. They have the grand jury transcript and want to use it in their civil rights lawsuit. Wary of a criminal statute that would make disclosure a misdemeanor, they seek permission from the state court. The state court denied the request, and they filed this special action. The Court of Appeals accepts jurisdiction and grants relief. Under these circumstances, where the defendants who were indicted but later dismissed are now plaintiffs, there is less interest in keeping things secret. The trial court needs to consider this reduced confidentiality interest. Further, while it is the state court’s role to decide the societal interest in secrecy and whether disclosure is appropriate, it is the federal court that determines if there is a specific need for this evidence in the civil case. We expect to learn more about this from the federal court and, if it proceeds, how plaintiffs navigate the immunity barriers.