The question here is whether an adopted child can sue for his natural father’s death. The Court of Appeals says “no.”

Edonna’s stepfather had adopted him years before his natural father died in a motorcycle crash with Heckman; in the interim, though, they had grown close and the stepfather had, apparently, gone out of the picture. When Edonna sued for the wrongful death Heckman moved to dismiss. The trial court denied it

The Court of Appeals reverses. It points out that the wrongful-death statute does not allow for weighing how close a relationship was.  By naming spouses, children, and parents as beneficiaries, the statute leaves out others who may have a close association with the decedent. While the statute does not define “child,” an adoption statute (8-117) says that upon adoption the original parent-child relationship “is completely severed and all the legal rights, privileges, duties, obligations and other legal consequences of the relationship cease to exist, including the right of inheritance . . .”  The right to sue for wrongful death is a legal consequence of the relationship.

Edonna cited an intestate-succession statute (14-2114) to the effect that adoption by the spouse of a natural parent has no effect on child’s right to inherit from the other natural parent. But the statute also says “An adopted person is the child of that person’s adopting parent or parents and not of the natural parents.” In Arizona the right to sue for wrongful death does not involve inheritance, it’s a claim for the beneficiary’s own loss. Edonna could inherit from his natural father but so could a lot of other people; that does not mark them all as statutory beneficiaries.

(link to opinion)

This is a ruling on a motion for partial dismissal of an appeal. It is published as an opinion, however, presumably to draw attention to a point of procedure.

The parties sued each other because of a business dispute. At trial Leonesio made an unsuccessful motion for JMOL, which he made again at the close of the evidence. The jury found for him on some things but awarded Marquette damages on others. The parties cross-appealed.

On appeal, Marquette moved to dismiss Leonesio’s contention that the verdict wasn’t supported by the evidence because the appeal statute (12-2102) requires a motion for new trial to preserve that argument. Leonesio’s position was that his “renewed” motion for JMOL did that.

(The court points out, in one of those very occasional useful footnotes, that Leonesio didn’t renew his JMOL motion. This is a difference between directed verdict and JMOL. DV had to be renewed at the conclusion of the evidence, which presumably explains why Leonesio did so. When JMOL replaced it the take-away was that you didn’t have to do that any more, lawyers having considered the renewal requirement a “trap,” i.e., a requirement that careless ones tended to forget. JMOL does get renewed, though, but after judgment rather than during trial.)

(The court implies that proper renewal would have preserved the argument. But that’s not the holding and, though it’s right, is technically an open issue. A 1950 case says that a Rule 50(b) motion will do; but while today that’s renewal of JMOL in 1950 it was judgment NOV, a slightly different beast that is mostly extinct, as are those of us who cut our teeth on DVs and NOVs.)

The court holds, citing a U.S. Supreme Court case construing the similar federal rule, that a trial motion for JMOL does not preserve on appeal the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence.

Applying that to this case, the court first says that Leonesio’s statute-of-limitations claim is barred. It’s a bit hard to tell whether that’s because the court considers that generically a sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue or whether (more likely, we think) Leonesio had failed to make his record on the limitations issue and so tried to argue it under a sufficiency rubric.

The court next says that Leonesio’s contention that Marquette ratified his actions was also a sufficiency argument. (But he hadn’t made a record on that, either, and in fact hadn’t argued it below at all.) Whether the evidence showed that certain provisions of an agreement were met was also a barred sufficiency argument, as was whether the evidence was sufficient for punitive damages (Leonesio raised a new one on appeal about that, too, and although it was a constitutional issue the court refused to consider it.)

(link to opinion)

This case concerns the importance of being earnest about arbitration.

Pinnamaneni’s corporation hired Smith’s corporation to build a home. The contract required AAA arbitration. When a dispute arose the builder demanded arbitration. The owner filed a complaint with the Registrar of Contractors and refused to arbitrate until it was resolved. The owner didn’t show up at the arbitration hearing; the builder presented evidence (these arbitration rules don’t allow default) and was given an award.

When it tried to have the award confirmed in court the owner opposed it. A week before the arbitration hearing the owner had discovered that the builder didn’t have a contractor’s license when it signed the contract. The builder argued that the owner had waived the defense by not appearing at arbitration.

The Court of Appeals agrees. “[A] contractor’s lack of licensure is an affirmative defense subject to waiver.” Its contracts are voidable, not void. Moreover, the court tells us, the only objections to confirmation of an arbitration award are those listed in 12-1512 (fraud, the arbitrators exceeded their power, etc.). So although the court uses the word, whether it’s an “affirmative” defense doesn’t seem to matter; the question is whether it’s a listed defense.

That takes sixteen pages. As usual, the court grinds on and on about the easy parts and gives the harder part – here, distinguishing California cases – a lick and a promise.

(Another issue was that the arbitrators had held Pinnamaneni personally liable even though he hadn’t signed the contract personally. That (lack of an arbitration agreement) is a listed defense. The trial court should therefore have ruled on that, it didn’t, and so on that issue the court remands. That takes seven endless pages.)

(link to opinion)