Abeyta v. Soos (CA2 2/19/14)

This special action involves claims of privilege by a non-but-closely-associated-party.

A social worker counseled Bruno and his domestic partner, Abeyta, jointly – i.e., she saw them together and kept a single chart. The partner ended up suing her and the psychiatric hospital she sent him to. He named Abeyta as a witness. The social worker disclosed her records and noticed Abeyta’s deposition. Abeyta claimed the privilege and moved for protective order. The trial court denied it; the Court of Appeals accepted his special action and grants relief.

Abeyta had never expressly waived the privilege; that the partner had is irrelevant. The court reviews HIPAA and State behavioral health regulations, concluding that they do not authorize or permit the release of Abeyta’s records. The defense relied on a case (Hahmann 1981) in which a couple’s communications with a psychologist were not privileged against each other in their divorce/custody battle. But Abeyta and his partner weren’t suing each other.

(Some of those regulations involve “family” counseling. Normally this sort of thing would trigger at least a footnote but the court doesn’t mention it. One wonders which the court was more afraid of – complaints that it would even quibble about whether same-sex couples are families or complaints about an official pronouncement that they are.)

The defense also relied on high dudgeon, as litigants tend to do when an opponent’s witness will claim a privilege at cross-examination time. But the court says that questions about matters at issue could be asked “outside the context” of the counseling and points out that Abeyta might still do something to waive the privilege.

Unfortunately for the opinion, which is otherwise fairly unremarkable, the court messed up the Hahmann case. It indicates – three times, so its not just a typo – that Hahmann involved attorney-client privilege. While that opinion analogized to attorney-client privilege, it was a psychologist–patient case. The court may be right that it wasn’t a spotted-horse case –  but not to know what sort of animal it was about is an embarrassment.

(link to opinion)

Estate of Ethridge v. Recovery Management Systems (CA1 2/13/14)

PLEASE NOTE that our link to the opinion now leads to the opinion  dated 5/13/2014, issued after a Motion for Reconsideration.

The case holds that Medicare part C (“Medicare Advantage”) plans have a lien against a personal-injury recovery. This will not surprise specialists in the mine field that this area of the law has become, though we’re happy to say we’re not among them. We mention the case because personal-injury practitioners will want to be aware of it.

Etheridge died in a nursing home; her estate sued the home; the case settled. The Advantage plan then sought reimbursement from the proceeds. The estate sued it for declaratory judgment. The trial court ruled for the plan; the Court of Appeals affirms.

Part C specifically pre-empts state law inconsistent with its “standards.” The court concludes that HHS regulations are Part C “standards” and that one of those regulations gives Advantage plan the same rights as traditional Medicare.

(link to opinion)

Lerner v. DMB Realty (CA1 2/13/14)

Look closely and you’ll spot that this is a “modified” opinion. It does mention that the Court of Appeals requested some supplemental briefing. What it doesn’t mention is that the court requested that briefing after it published an opinion in the case. We blogged that here. This opinion supersedes one that is over a year old. Would it have been too much trouble to mention that?

The result of the case doesn’t change. The court’s discussion of the fraud allegation against the sellers is expanded somewhat. The precise legal effect of the changes isn’t clear but its purport is apparently to help convince the majority that not revealing something you have no obligation to reveal can indeed be fraud if you’re asked a direct question the truthful answer to which would reveal it.

(link to opinion)