The Arizona Supreme Court upholds judicial immunity for a constable serving a writ of eviction. A constable cannot be sued for negligence or gross negligence. The writ statute, A.R.S. §11-449, imposes liability when a constable is “guilty of any misconduct” but this imposes liability only for intentional wrongful acts such as a failure to comply with the court’s command to execute the writ. The court differentiates by giving an analogy: “Gross negligence is playing with matches near a dry forest with a burn ban in effect: reckless, irresponsible, without regard for others, and with a high probability of substantial harm. Misconduct, on the other hand, is the intentional act of lighting a match with the purpose of causing a wildfire.” Because Fox alleged only negligence and gross negligence, she cannot overcome immunity. The court uses, as we saw a couple of years ago in Matthews, corpus linguistics as a tool in ascertaining what “guilty of misconduct” meant when the statute was enacted. This gives the opinion an uncomfortable feeling, which Justice Timmer highlights in her concurring opinion. But we are even more uncomfortable with what she suggests. Justice Timmer suggests retaining competing corpus-linguistic experts when interpreting statutes. To borrow from Chief Justice Marshall, it isn’t quite “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”