Metzler won a jury verdict in excess of an Offer of Judgment she had made. Per Rule 68, the trial court ordered pre-judgment interest from the date of the offer to the date of the judgment. The court then, on BCI’s motion, ordered a new trial, on liability only, but this was reversed on appeal and the case remanded for the entry of judgment. On remand, the following question arose: does the pre-judgment interest run until the date of the original judgment or until the date of the judgment after remand? Until the original judgment, ruled the trial court; Metzler appealed.

The Court of Appeals reverses. The order granting a new trial vacated the original judgment. The trial court had thought it still a valid judgment because BCI had purported to appeal from it; Technically, though, the appeal from an order for new trial, the court indicates, is from that order itself, not from the judgment; that is why 12-2101 makes a new trial order appealable. The court says that this conclusion is also consistent with the Rule’s purpose of encouraging settlement.

The court vacates the judgment, remands for the entry of another new one, and points out that pre-judgment interest will run until that one is entered. This apparently means that the new interest statute will apply, so this might be a Pyrrhic victory.

(link to opinion)

The parties obtained harassment injunctions against each other. McGee asked for a hearing to quash Kimicata’s injunction, which the trial court did. McGee then asked for, and was granted, over $16,000 in attorney fees under 12-1809N. Kimicata appealed the fee award.

She argued that the statute’s first sentence relates to “enforcement” of court orders and so applies only to violation proceedings. The Court of Appeals holds that that sentence doesn’t restrict the third sentence, which is the one about fees and which refers to the “action,” not just the enforcement.

The statute requires a hearing but since Kimicata didn’t ask for one the court holds that she waived it. She also waived her argument that the trial court had to make findings of fact, by not asking the trial court to do so. But the opinion says that the trial court doesn’t have to do that anyhow.

One wonders whether all those court programs that encourage and teach do-it-yourself harassment injunctions will now mention that they can escalate the problem to a new level by introducing a huge financial issue. Great for lawyers, though.

(link to opinion)

Castle bought a ‘57 T-bird at a Barrett-Jackson auction, then sued Barrett-Jackson and the seller/consignor for consumer fraud. The Complaint didn’t allege that Barrett-Jackson misrepresented anything and the sale paperwork said that all representations were the consignor’s.  The trial court dismissed the Complaint against Barrett-Jackson. Castle appealed.

He argued that the paperwork can’t relieve a party of its own fraud. But the paperwork didn’t do that, it was simply evidence that Barrett-Jackson hadn’t made any representations.

So Castle argued reasonable expectations. He said he shouldn’t have been expected to read the language at issue because it was in small print. But the circumstances required by Darner were not present to indicate that indicate that Barrett-Jackson had reason to believe that Castle wouldn’t have accepted the term (i.e., the term wasn’t weird or oppressive and didn’t violate the express terms or the purpose of the agreement).

(link to opinion)